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CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-DUE PROCESS-BURDEN OF
PROOF-AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES-The United States Supreme Court
has held that the New York murder statute does not deprive a
defendant of due process by placing on him the burden of proving
the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance since the
defense does not serve to negate an element of the crime.
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197.(1977).
Appellant, Gordon Patterson, and his wife, Roberta, had a brief,
volatile marriage. Roberta separated from the appellant and re-
sumed dating John Northrup, her former fiance. Some months
later, appellant went to the residence of his father-in-law carrying
a rifle and, after observing his wife partially unclothed with North-
rup, shot Northrup twice in the head, killing him.' Patterson con-
fessed' to the homicide and was charged with second degree mur-
der.3
Under New York law, the crime of second degree murder has two
elements: intent to cause the death of another person, and causing
the death of that person or another person.' The prosecution need
not prove malice aforethought as an element of murder.5 As an
ameliorative element of the statute, New York permits the defen-
dant to assert, as an affirmative defense, that he acted under the
influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a
reasonable explanation or excuse. Successful proof of the defense
1. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 198 (1977).
2. After a pretrial hearing, the confession was held to be voluntary and was admitted into
evidence against Patterson at trial. See People v. Patterson, 39 N.Y.2d 288, 291, 347 N.E.2d
898, 900, 383 N.Y.S.2d 573, 575 (1976).
3. See 432 U.S. at 198.
4. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(1) (McKinney 1975). The statute is reprinted in relevant part
at note 6 infra.
5. 432 U.S. at 198.
6. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(1)(a) (McKinney 1975) provides in relevant part:
A person is guilty of murder in the second degree when:
1. With intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of such
person or of a third person; except that in any prosecution under this subdivision, it is
an affirmative defense that:
(a) The defendant acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for
which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the reasonableness of which is to
be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant's situation under the
circumstances as the defendant believed them to be. Nothing contained in this para-
graph shall constitute a defense to a prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of,
manslaughter in the first degree or any other crime . . ..
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reduces the criminal act from murder to manslaughter.7
Appellant raised this defense at trial.' The jury was instructed,
consistent with New York law,' that the state had the burden of
proving the elements of the crime of second degree murder beyond
a reasonable doubt" and that the defendant had the burden of
proving his affirmative defense by a preponderance ofthe evi-
dence." The jury found appellant guilty of murder, judgment was
entered on the verdict, and the appellate division affirmed." While
his appeal to the New York Court of Appeals was pending, 3 the
United States Supreme Court decided Mullaney v. Wilbur, '4 declar-
ing Maine's murder statute to be unconstitutional as violative of
due process for improperly shifting the burden of persuasion on the
issue of heat of passion, or lack of malice aforethought, an element
7. 39 N.Y.2d at 293, 347 N.E.2d at 901, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 576. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.20
(McKinney 1975) provides in relevant part:
A person is guilty of manslaughter in the first degree when:
2. With intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of such
person or of a third person under circumstances which do not constitute murder be-
cause he acts under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance, as defined in
paragraph (a) of subdivision one of section 125.25. The fact that homicide was commit-
ted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance constitutes a mitigating
circumstance reducing murder to manslaughter in the first degree and need not be
proved in any prosecution initiated under this subdivision.
8. See 432 U.S. at 199. Appellant also asserted that the killing was unintentional, claim-
ing that the gun went off accidentally. See id. at 199 n.4. For purposes of the appeal, the Court
held that it was undisputed that the prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the
killing was intentional. Id.
9. Id. at 200. That the instructions were consistent with state law was not discussed
further by the majority and was not contested by the dissent.
10. See id. at 199-200 (quoting the trial court's charge). The Supreme Court viewed the
judge's instructions as emphatic and repeated as to the reasonable doubt burden of proof.
Id. at 200 n.5. The trial court's explanation of intent is quoted in 39 N.Y.2d at 291-92, 347
N.E.2d at 901, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 575-76.
11. See 432 U.S. at 200. If the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was
intentional but that the appellant had proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he
had acted under the influence of an extreme emotional disturbance, it was instructed to find
appellant guilty of manslaughter instead of murder. See id.
12. 41 App. Div. 2d 1028, 344 N.Y.S.2d 836 (1973).
13. Prior to Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975), Patterson had appealed on the
following grounds: that communications between appellant and his wife were privileged and
were erroneously admitted as evidence; that appellant was deprived of a fair trial under the
fifth, sixth, and fourteenth amendments; that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of
law; and that the judge erred by repeatedly referring to appellant's post-shooting statement
as a confession. 39 N.Y.2d at 289-90, 347 N.E.2d at 900, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 575.
14. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
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of the crime, to the defendant. 5
Appellant urged that the Maine and New York statutes were
functionally equivalent and that his conviction should be reversed. 6
The court of appeals, however, affirmed his conviction, distinguish-
ing Mullaney on the ground that under the New York statute malice
aforethought was not an element of the crime. Therefore, by requir-
ing the defendant to prove extreme emotional disturbance (i.e., lack
of malice aforethought), New York was not shifting the burden of
proof on an element of the crime and did not offend Mullaney. 17
The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction on Patterson's
appeal" and, after oral argument, affirmed. 9 The majority0 agreed
with the New York Court of Appeals that the murder statute did
not violate defendant's due process rights since the affirmative de-
fense did not serve to negate an element of the crime.2 ' Speaking for
the majority, Justice White first noted that the state has a substan-
tial interest in criminal prosecutions and that the regulation of
criminal procedure, including allocation of the burden of persua-
sion, was normally within the power of the state.2 A criminal stat-
ute, the Court said, should not be held unconstitutional unless it
deeply offends traditional principles of justice.23
In deciding the case, the majority emphasized the difference be-
15. Id. at 704. Specifically, the Court held "the Due Process Clause requires the prosecu-
tion to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of the heat of passion on sudden provoca-
tion when the issue is properly presented in a homicide case." Id.
16. See 432 U.S. at 201. It was not until Mullaney was handed down that appellant first
challenged the constitutionality of the New York murder statute. Since the appellant had not
objected to the charge concerning the extreme emotional disturbance defense, the court of
appeals questioned whether he had preserved a question of law for review. The court noted
that it was a law court and that usually a question of law could not have been preserved under
the circumstances. But if the burden of proof was wrong, as alleged, then, the court said, the
appellant would have been deprived of a fair trial. Such a finding would have been a
"fundamental, nonwaivable defect in the mode of procedure." Therefore, the court allowed
the question to be presented even though it was not formally raised below. 39 N.Y.2d at 294-
95, 347 N.E.2d at 902-03, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 575. The court of appeals also decided that
Mullaney would be given retroactive effect. Id. at 296, 347 N.E.2d at 903, 383 N.Y.S.2d at
578.
17. See 432 U.S. at 201.
18. Patterson v. New York, 429 U.S. 813 (1976).
19. 432 U.S. at 216.
20. The Court affirmed 5-3. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the decision.
21. 432 U.S. at 205-06.
22. Id. at 201. Justice White said, "We should not lightly construe the Constitution so as
to intrude upon the administration of justice by the individual States." Id.
23. Id. at 202.
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tween the Maine and New York statutes." In Maine, the Court said,
a killing could be punished as murder when it resulted from a delib-
erate, cruel act committed suddenly by one person against another
person without sufficient provocation.25 New York defined murder
as causing the death of another person with the intent to do so.2"
Thus, malice aforethought was not required under the New York
definition, while it was under Maine's.17 Further, the Court consid-
ered Maine's policy of presuming the element of malice, or lack of
provocation, which could only be rebutted by the defendant proving
that he acted under a heat of passion. 8 From this the Court con-
cluded that Maine shifted the burden of persuasion on the very
element which differentiated murder from manslaughter.29 Nothing
was presumed or implied under the New York law.'" The Court
concluded that while under the guidelines set forth in In Re
Winship3 Maine had improperly shifted the burden of persuasion
24. Id. at 205-06.
25. Id. at 213, 215.
26. Id. at 205-06. The Court noted that once an intentional killing was proved, New York
intended to deal with the defendant as a murderer unless he proved the mitigating circum-
stances. Id. at 206.
27. Id. This analysis of Maine law, which is similar to the treatment by the New York
Court of Appeals, has been criticized as a misinterpretation. See Note, Affirmative Defenses
After Mullaney v. Wilbur: New York's Extreme Emotional Disturbance, 43 BROOKLYN L. REV.
171, 175-77 (1976) [hereinafter cited as New York's Extreme Emotional Disturbance]; Note,
People v. Patterson: the Constitutionality of New York's Affirmative Defense of Extreme
Emotional Disturbance, 51 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 158, 170-73, 180 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
New York's Affirmative Defense].
Indeed, the Maine Supreme Court expressly rejected this interpretation of its murder
statute by a federal district court, saying, "the Federal Court was of the impression that this
crime includes, in addition to an intentional and unlawful killing, the independent element
of 'malice aforethought.' Such is not, and never has been, the law of Maine." State v.
Lafferty, 309 A.2d 647, 664 (Me. 1973). It appears, therefore, that the Supreme Court in
Mullaney rejected Maine's interpretation and decided that malice aforethought was a sub-
stantive element of the crime of murder. See also notes 69 & 77 infra.
28. 432 U.S. at 216.
29. Id. The State of New York read the Maine statute as requiring the same burden of
proof for murder and manslaughter. "Having established sufficient proof of an intent to
commit the crime of manslaughter, the State would gain a conviction for the crime of murder,
unless the defendant proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he acted in the heat of
passion on sudden provocation." Brief for Respondent at 13, Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S.
197 (1977) (emphasis in original).
30. 432 U.S. at 216.
31. 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (the due process clause protects the accused against conviction
except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime
with which he is charged). The Winship decision is discussed in an historical perspective in
the text accompanying notes 51-53 infra.
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regarding an element of murder to the defendant, New York had
not.:12
The majority determined that affirmative defenses are not uncon-
stitutional per se.Y By recognizing a mitigating circumstance, the
Court said, a state should not then be required to prove its nonexist-
ence.:" To hold otherwise, the majority felt, would conflict with
Leland v. Oregon," which held that a state may constitutionally
require a defendant who pleads insanity to establish that fact be-
yond a reasonable doubt. 6 Under the Oregon scheme the burden of
proving the elements of the crime was upon the prosecution at all
times and the jury was only to consider the question of legal insanity
after the prosecution had proved its statutory case. 7 The Leland
Court held this did not violate due process."
The majority had reason to believe that Leland had survived the
tremors of Winship and Mullaney. Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Rehnquist, concurring in Mullaney, expressed the opinion that
there was no inconsistency between Leland and Mullaney."' The
Patterson majority found the procedural schemes in Leland and
Patterson to be analogous and, therefore, with Leland still preced-
ent and Mullaney distinguishable, the Court followed Leland and
upheld the New York statute."
32. 432 U.S. at 215-16.
33. Id. at 208-09.
34. Id. at 209. On this point, the Court substantially adopted the rationale of Chief Justice
Breitel, who concurred in the result of the New York Court of Appeals' decision. See id. at
211 n.13. Chief Justice Breitel said that when affirmative defenses are intelligently used they
can provide for an ameliorating scheme of gradation of a crime and could also prevent
legislative abuse. 39 N.Y.2d at 305-07, 347 N.E.2d at 909-10, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 583-85 (Breitel,
C.J., concurring).
35. 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
36. See 432 U.S. at 204. Of the 20 states which placed the burden of proving insanity on
the defendant at the time, only Oregon required proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 343 U.S.
at 798.
37. See 432 U.S. at 204.
38. Patterson contended on appeal that the insanity defense was distinguishable from
extreme emotional disturbance because the former did not bear a necessary relationship to
the required mental element of the crime. Extreme emotional disturbance, on the other hand,
determined the degree of culpability necessary for intent to murder. Brief for Appellant at
14, Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
39. 421 U.S. 684, 705 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). The constitutionality of burdening the
defendant with proving an insanity defense was challenged subsequent to Mullaney in Rivera
v. Delaware, 429 U.S. 877 (1976). In that case, the Court apparently rejected the contention
that Leland was overruled by Winship and Mullaney when it dismissed the appeal as not
presenting a substantial federal question. See 432 U.S. at 205.
40. 432 U.S. at 206-07.
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Justice Powell, who authored the Mullaney opinion, dissented in
Patterson," charging that the majority had ignored the clear dic-
tates of both Winship and Mullaney.42 The majority, Justice Powell
said, had exalted form over substance by looking at the state defini-
tion of the elements of the crime.43 He based this conclusion on
language used by the majority that the only facts necessary to con-
stitute a crime are those appearing on the face of the statute." He
viewed the Court's reasoning as a sharp break from Mullaney and
as a license for legislative abuse .4 The Court's guidelines, he said,
gave a state the latitude to drop a cumbersome element of a crime
and then require the defendant to disprove its existence."
Justice Powell concluded that malice aforethought, or the ab-
sence of extreme emotional disturbance, was in fact a substantive
element of the crime of murder in New York. 7 He reached that
conclusion by applying the two-part test he espoused in Mullaney.
First, he said, the factor at issue, i.e., absence of extreme emotional
disturbance, resulted in a substantial difference in punishment and
stigma. 8 Second, this factor, although more historically referred to
as malice aforethought, has traditionally been the single most im-
portant factor in determining the degree of culpability necessary for
murder. Since the factor appeared in both the Maine and New York
situations, Justice Powell reasoned that Mullaney should necessar-
ily control in Patterson.49
41. Justices Brennan and Marshall joined in this opinion.
42. 432 U.S. at 222-23 (Powell, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 221. Justice Powell expressed the fear that if Winship were limited to the state's
definition of the elements of a crime the state could, by clever draftsmanship, shift the burden
of persuasion on any factor to the defendant as long as the nonexistence of such factor was
not an element of the crime. Id. at 223. The result, he argued, would be that a state could
convict a defendant for murder if it proved he was the cause in fact of another person's death
and then force the defendant to disprove intent. Id. at 224 n.8. Justice Powell then expressed
doubt, however, that his hypothetical statute would be found constitutional. Id. at 225 n.9.
44. Justice White said, "The Due Process Clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt all of the elements included in the definition of the offense of which the
defendant is charged." 432 U.S. at 210 (emphasis added).
45. Id. at 223.
46. Id. at 224-25. Justice Powell looked to the practical effect; the existence of heat of
passion was equivalent to the absence of malice aforethought. Id. at 217 (citing the trial
court's charge in Mullaney that "malice aforethought and heat of passion on sudden provoca-
tion are two inconsistent things").
47. 432 U.S. at 226-27.
48. Id. This requirement applied a fortiori if the factor determined the difference between
guilt and innocence. Id. at 226.
49. Id. If both branches of the test were not met, then the shift in the burden of proof
was constitutional. Id. at 227.
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The Patterson decision is the most recent development in the
Supreme Court's scrutiny of the constitutionality of placing the
burden of persuasion on a defendant to prove an affirmative de-
fense. 50 Historically, the prosecution in a criminal action has the
burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.5" It was not until
1970, however, that the Supreme Court expressed a constitutional
basis for this recognized requirement, declaring in In re Winship
that the due process clause protects the accused against conviction
except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary
to constitute the crime with which he is charged.52
Applying Winship, the Supreme Court in Mullaney found that
Maine had unconstitutionally placed the burden on the defendant
to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the killing had
occurred without malice aforethought.5 3 Under Maine law, murder
and manslaughter were not distinct crimes but, rather, different
categories of the general crime of felonious homicide,5 with malice
50. While the prosecution has traditionally had the burden of coming forward with the
evidence and the burden of persuasion on the question of guilt, the defendant has been
allowed certain excuses or justifications, i.e., affirmative defenses. Insanity, self-defense, and
intoxication are examples. In some jurisdictions, the defendant has the burden of proving the
affirmative defense claimed, but the modern trend is to impose upon the defendant only the
burden' of first producing evidence and then requiring the prosecution to disprove the defense.
See W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 21, at 152-53 (1972). Professors
LaFave and Scott suggest a two-part test to determine the constitutionality of affirmative
defenses: (1) whether the defense is so central to the nature of the offense that the prosecu-
tion, in effect, is freed from the burden of proving conduct by the defendant that results in
grave consequences; and (2) whether placing the burden on the defendant to justify his claim
is called for by a need for narrowing the issues and the defendant's peculiar accessibility to
the evidence. Id. § 21, at 154.
51. See id. § 8, at 44.
52. 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). Justice Black, dissenting, admitted that proof beyond a
reasonable doubt was traditionally required in criminal trials, but he found no constitutional
basis under the due process clause for such a degree of proof unless the particular jurisdiction
required that standard. Id. at 385-86.
The Court's holding in Winship has been criticized as going too far. See Allen, Mullaney
v. Wilbur, the Supreme Court, and the Substantive Criminal Law-An Examination of the
Limits of Legitimate Intervention, 55 TEX. L. REV. 269, 269-71 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Alleni. Professor Allen suggests that to resolve the case before it, the Court had only to decide
whether, as a general rule of constitutional jurisprudence, the due process clause required
proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. By extending the standard to "every fact necessary
to constitute the crime," the Court, in effect, gave itself the power to identify what the facts
ought to be, an area he regards as traditionally "the peculiar preserve of the states." Id. at
270.
53. 421 U.S. at 684. In Mullaney, the defendant had fatally assaulted the decedent while
in a frenzy provoked by the decedent's homosexual assault. The defendant contended that
he was guilty of no more than manslaughter because he killed in a heat of passion. Id. at 685.
54. Id. at 688. Maine's murder statute provided: "Whoever unlawfully kills a human
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aforethought as the distinguishing element.15 Once the prosecution
proved that the homicide was both intentional and unlawful, malice
aforethought was to be implied unless the defendant proved by a
preponderance of the evidence that he had acted in a heat of passion
on sudden provocation. 5 A distinction was therefore drawn between
murder and manslaughter, bottomed on the existence or absence of
malice aforethought.57 The Court held that the statutory scheme, in
practical effect, forced the defendant to disprove an element of the
crime of murder, i.e., malice aforethought.58 The Court unanimously
struck down this procedural scheme as unconstitutional, finding
Winship controlling. 9
Although Mullaney was criticized for failing to define a sufficient
test to determine the constitutionality of affirmative defenses, 0
state courts immediately began to invalidate or weaken similar sta-
tutory schemes.6 ' While Mullaney held that it was unconstitutional
being with malice aforethought, either express or implied, is guilty of murder and shall be
punished by imprisonment for life." ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17, § 2651 (1954) (repealed 1975).
Maine's manslaughter statute provided in relevant part: "Whoever unlawfully kills a
human being in the heat of passion, on sudden provocation, without express or implied malice
aforethought ... shall be punished by a fine of not more than $1,000 or by imprisonment
for not more than 20 years. ... Id. § 2551 (1961) (repealed 1975).
55. 421 U.S. at 688.
56. Id. at 689. See also State v. Lafferty, 309 A.2d 647, 670-73 (Me. 1973) (discussing the
distinction between murder and manslaughter).
Jurisdictions have differed concerning the meaning of malice aforethought. Some view it
as a substantive element of intent which the prosecution must prove, while other jurisdictions
have taken the position that absent proof to the contrary a homicide is presumed not to have
occurred in a heat of passion. 421 U.S. at 694. For a historical overview of malice aforethought,
see Perkins, A Re-Examination of Malice Aforethought, 43 YALE L.J. 537 (1934).
57. 421 U.S. at 698. See also note 54 supra (reprinting the murder and manslaughter
statutes).
58. 421 U.S. at 698. The trial court charged the jury that malice aforethought and heat
of passion were two inconsistent things and that by proving the latter the defendant would
negate the former. Id. at 686-87.
59. Id. at 698. The Winship Court cited the following reasons for the indispensable re-
quirement of the reasonable doubt standard in criminal law: possible loss of liberty, stigmati-
zation by society, and community confidence in the judicial system. 397 U.S. at 363-64. The
Mullaney Court found that the Maine procedural scheme denigrated those interests. 421 U.S.
at 698.
The Court's failure to explain why the Winship factors mandated reversal in Mullaney has
been criticized. See New York's Extreme Emotional Disturbance, supra note 27, at 186.
60. See Allen, supra note 52, at 290-91; Tushnet, Constitutional Limitation of Substantive
Criminal Law: An Examination of the Meaning of Mullaney v. Wilbur, 55 B.U.L. REV. 775,
802 (1975); New York's Affirmative Defense, supra note 27, at 180; Note, The New York Penal
Law's Affirmative Defenses After Mullaney v. Wilbur, 27 SYRACUSE L. REV. 834, 864 (1976).
61. See, e.g., Fuentes v. State, 349 A.2d 1 (Del. 1975) (statutory requirement that murder
defendant bear burden of proving extreme emotional disturbance held unconstitutional under
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to require a defendant to prove an affirmative defense which specifi-
cally negated an express element of the crime charged, it did not
address the problem posed by a statutory scheme which required a
defendant to raise an affirmative defense which determined blame-
worthiness where that defense did not serve to negate an express
statutory element.2
The stage was thus set for consideration of New York's murder
statute which did not require the prosecution to prove malice
aforethought but which permitted the defendant to reduce the
crime to manslaughter by proving extreme emotional disturbance. "
Several lower state courts had concluded the section was void under
Mullaney,"4 but the New York Court of Appeals upheld its constitu-
tionality in People v. Patterson, 5 holding that the New York statute
was within the constitutional boundaries set by Mullaney. The Su-
preme Court, presented with the statutory question left unanswered
in Mullaney, agreed with the court of appeals that the New York
statute did not possess the constitutional defects of the Maine stat-
ute."
The Maine and New York statutes must be distinguished, if at
all, by the existence or absence of malice aforethought as a substan-
the due process clause); Evans v. State, 28 Md. App. 640, 349 A.2d 300 (1975) (jury instruc-
tion that malice might be presumed, relieving state of the burden of proving element of non-
mitigation held unconstitutional); State v. Hankerson, 288 N.C. 632, 220 S.E.2d 575 (1975)
(requirement that defendant in a homicide case rebut presumption of malice by proving that
he killed in a heat of passion denied due process), rev'd, 432 U.S. 233 (1977); Pinkerton v.
Farr, 220 S.E.2d 682 (W. Va. 1975) (statute requiring defendant to testify if he is proven guilty
along with others of felonious assault in order to rebut presumption that he is also guilty of
assault in pursuance of combination or conspiracy was unconstitutional).
62. The situation had been debated in the abstract prior to Mullaney. A hypothetical
statute establishes a crime with elements A, B, and C, and further provides that C will be
presumed unless the defendant proves the nonexistence of C (not-C) as an affirmative defense
(this was the scheme in Mullaney). See Ashford & Risinger, Presumptions, Assumptions, and
Due Process in Criminal Cases: A Theoretical Overview, 79 YALE L.J. 165, 186-93 (1969);
Christie & Pye, Presumptions and Assumptions in the Criminal Law: Another View, 1970
DUKE L.J. 919, 933-38. If that scheme is unconstitutional, what then becomes of a statute
which only requires the prosecution to prove A and B but still allows the defendant to mitigate
the punishment by proving not-C? See Allen, supra note 52, at 286-91. He postulates that
such a statute could be upheld but that to do so might be an exaltation of form over sub-
stance. Id. at 288.
63. See note 6 and text accompanying note 4 supra.
64. People v. Davis, 49 App. Div. 2d 437, 376 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1975), rev'd, 40 N.Y.2d 836,
356 N.E.2d 290, 387 N.Y.S.2d 837 (1976); People v. Woods, 84 Misc. 2d 301, 375 N.Y.S.2d
750 (Sup. Ct. 1975); People v. Balogun, 82 Misc. 2d 907, 372 N.Y.S.2d 384 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
65. 39 N.Y.2d 288, 291, 347 N.E.2d 898, 900, 383 N.Y.S.2d 573, 575 (1976).
66. 432 U.S. at 211-12.
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tive element. Maine's statute defined murder as the unlawful killing
of a human being with malice aforethought. Procedurally, the prose-
cution was not required to prove malice aforethought because it
would be implied, unless the defendant could prove that he acted
in a heat of passion." The New York statute defined murder as the
killing of another person with the intent to do so." Therefore, while
Maine expressly lists malice aforethought as an element and pre-
sumes its existence, New York does neither.
In Mullaney, Justice Powell applied his two-part test and found
that malice aforethought was a substantive element of the crime of
murder." The Patterson majority, however, returned to the Maine
statute and reconsidered it, this time ignoring the Mullaney test.
The majority confined the Mullaney holding by stating that despite
the Maine Supreme Court's assertion that malice aforethought was
not a substantive element of murder under the Maine statute, due
process did not permit shifting the burden of persuasion with re-
spect to a fact that must be proven or presumed.70
The Patterson majority then considered the New York murder
statute, again ignoring the Mullaney test, and agreed with the New
York Court of Appeals' interpretation that the statute did not in-
clude malice aforethought as a substantive element of murder.7' The
majority relied heavily on the fact that malice aforethought was not
presumed under New York law and was not otherwise required to
be proved.72 Thus the Court properly concluded that the affirmative
defense of extreme emotional disturbance did not serve to negate an
essential element of the crime.
The majority went further, however, and unnecessarily. left the
67. See text accompanying note 56 supra.
68. See note 26 and accompanying text supra.
69. See notes 47-49 and accompanying text supra. Justice Powell also said: "We accept
as binding the Maine Supreme Judicial Court's construction of state homicide law." 421 U.S.
at 691. However, since the Maine Supreme Judicial Court had determined that malice
aforethought was not an element of murder, State v. Lafferty, 309 A.2d 647, 664 (Me. 1973),
Justice Powell's conclusion that malice aforethought was an element of murder is clearly
inconsistent and indicates that he, in fact, did not accept the state court interpretation. By
finding that malice aforethought was an element of murder in Maine, Justice Powell would
have had to rely on traditional common law notions (by using his two-part test) or on the
wording of the statute. If he relied on the latter, then he, himself, was overly formalistic.
70. Justice White, speaking for the majority in Patterson, also observed that the trial
court in Mullaney instructed the jury that malice aforethought was an essential and indispen-
sable element of the crime of murder. 432 U.S. at 212-13.
71. See text accompanying note 17 supra.
72. 432 U.S. at 216.
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impression that the statutory definition of a crime should be given
controlling weight in determining substance." This was directly
contrary to the warning given by Justice Powell in Mullaney that
the Winship holding was not limited to the statutory definition. 7'
Since the substance of a crime must be construed in a due process
challenge," some test to determine substance, rather than the literal
statutory elements, is essential. However, neither Mullaney nor
Patterson articulated a sufficient test that could be applied gener-
ally, and in fact, when viewed together, they indicate inconsistent
methods of testing. The Patterson majority accepted the New York
Court of Appeals' definition of the substance of its murder statute,
but the Mullaney Court had previously rejected Maine's interpreta-
tion of its murder statute and instead applied the two-part test
outlined by Justice Powell. 7 Traditionally, state court interpreta-
tions of substance have been accepted by the Supreme Court 77 and
there is no valid reason to take that power away since state court
interpretations remain subject to Supreme Court scrutiny in light
of accepted constitutional standards," thus limiting potential
abuses.
The fact that the Patterson majority did not apply Justice Pow-
ell's two-part test seems to indicate that it has rejected at least that
part of the Mullaney approach .7  The majority may have felt the
73. See note 44 and accompanying text supra. Justice White could have relied solely on
the state court interpretation.
74. 421 U.S. at 699 n.24.
75. Id. at 699.
76. See notes 47-49 & 69 and accompanying text supra. Justice Powell's test gave the
Supreme Court the power to determine the substance of a crime and, in practical effect,
dictated that the substance of the crime should be controlled by traditional common law
standards.
77. Justice Powell conceded this point in his dissent in Patterson, writing: "In the usual
case it is well established that an authoritative construction by the State's highest court 'puts
[appropriate] words in the statute as definitely as if it had been so amended by the legisla-
ture.'" 432 U.S. at 223 n.7. As authority for this proposition, he cited Winters v. New York,
333 U.S. 507, 514 (1948). Why Justice Powell made this concession is unclear since he ignored
the state court interpretation in both Mullaney and Patterson and instead applied his own
test.
78. Justice White said: "[Tihere are obvious constitutional limits beyond which the
States may not go in this regard." 432 U.S. at 210. For example, a defendant may not be
presumed guilty. The judiciary could also void extreme legislative enactments on these
grounds: vagueness, imposition of a cruel and unusual punishment, and violating traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice. See generally Comment, Unburdening the Crimi-
nal Defendant: Mullaney v. Wilbur and the Reasonable Doubt Standard, 11 HARV. C.R.-
C.L.L. REv. 390, 394 (1976).
79. If the Patterson Court had applied the two-part Mullaney test, it would have reached
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Court went too far in Mullaney and that, unless it affirmed Patter-
son's conviction, all affirmative defenses would thereafter be uncon-
stitutional."'
If Patterson can be read as invalidating the Mullaney approach,
then the Patterson decision does provide guidance to states in deter-
mining the constitutionality of other affirmative defenses. A state
may eliminate a fact needed for conviction from a criminal statute
if such fact is not a substantive element of the crime as determined
by the state courts. It follows that where an affirmative defense does
not serve to negate the remaining elements, then, as in Patterson,
the statutory scheme should not be invalidated.
Anthony J. Krastek
the same result that Justice Powell reached in his dissent: malice aforethought was a substan-
tive element of the New York murder statute. As Justice Powell pointed out, the two factors
used to determine that malice aforethought was an element of the Maine statute-substantial
punishment differential and a similar level of importance in common law-were also present
in the New York crime of murder. 432 U.S. at 225-27.
80. Legal writers had expressed the concern that Mullaney had, in fact, invalidated all
affirmative defenses. See Allen, supra note 52, at 275.
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